Institutional Failure of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)- case study of radioactive leakage in Mayapuri, Delhi

Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) has been entrusted with the responsibility of laying down safety standards, and framing rules and regulations covering regulatory and safety functions envisaged under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. It was constituted on November 15, 1983 by the President of India by exercising the powers conferred by the Atomic Energy Act to carry out certain regulatory and safety functions under the Act. The stated mission of AERB is to ensure that the use of ionising radiation and nuclear energy in India does not cause unacceptable damage to the health of workers handling such materials and to the environment. However, in April 2010, one of India’s top educational institutions Delhi University which operates right under the ruling establishment has been found guilty of mishandling of a highly radioactive material Cobalt-60, categorised as a radioactive source ‘that can cause permanent injury to a person handling the material even for a short time without appropriate safety measures and protection, Co-60 is used in industrial applications such as industrial radiography cameras, nucleonic gauges for thickness measurement and in well-logging operations, and in medical equipment (Blood irradiators and radiotherapy units).

In utter disregard to safety norms and regulations aforesaid university auctioned various items including the instrument containing Cobalt 60, which ultimately landed up in a metal scrapyard in Mayapuri are of Delhi on 9^th April,2010. In the junkyard workers got affected by radiation poisioning from the material while dismantling the instrument resulting in death of one person and hospitalised 6 others. Since then, the Crisis Management Group in the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and other officers from DAE and AERB have camped in the national capital with a range of radiation monitoring and detecting equipment for prompt identification and recovery of the radioactive pieces and their safe disposal. This piece of Cobalt 60 was manufactured by Atomic Energy Canada and bought by University in 1968 and was not being used since 1985.

This sounds bizzare, but it is not something that AERB has not seen before. India’s top radiation safety regulator has probed 16 such cases across the country since 2000 in which radioactive material was either stolen or lost. Equally responsible is administration of Delhi University for this mess, the university authorities in the Chemistry Department did not think twice before sending radioactive Gamma Cell Irradiator 220 lying unused for more than 25 years in a corner to a junk dealer in the heart of the capital. Ten academic experts who were part of the committee that approved disposal of this instrument - which had a Cobalt 60 source that could emit radiation for another billion seconds - without bothering about the stringent rules that govern such radioactive wastes. Under current regulations, the university is supposed to have a designated "radiological safety officer". Apparently, the university has flouted even this most basic regulatory requirement. If such a person had been there, he/she would have had the list of all radioactive materials within the campus and the experts committee would have at least been alerted about such equipment.

The regulatory system of inspection and monitoring put in place by the AERB, though detailed and elaborate, is actually not fool-proof. There have been instances year after year of loss and theft of sources from installations, particularly industrial sites. Most of these incidents, however, are not due to the inadequacy of the AERB's regulatory system but due to non-compliance and laxity on the part of the end-users. It is quite ironic that shortly after the Mayapuri incident AERB had issued revised guidelines pertaining to safety and security of radioactive materials and announced a special meeting on regulatory aspects of safety and security of industrial radiography sources. There have been many instances of thefts and other unusual occurences reported by AERB. The number of such incidents is not large considering that thousands of radiological sources have been distributed to users all over the country. But the seriousness of the radiological accidents demands that there should be zero-tolerance to such incidents. The periodic occurrences suggests that it is well within the realm of possibility that even domestic radioactive devices, supplied by the Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology (BRIT) and registered with the AERB, could end up in a scrap market. Such instances have occurred in the past and it is the stated mission of AERB to prevent such incidents which play havoc with the lives of common people. Some cases come to light too often like, in 2004, an industrial radiography source with a relatively high activity of 2.5 Curies (Ci) of Iridium-192 was stolen from the pit room of a radiography institute (later recovered), in Mumbai in 2005 a man stole a radioactive source and threw it into the Vashi Creek, in September 2008 a technician, about to board a train from the Hazrat Nizamuddin railway station, New Delhi lost his suitcase containing an Industrial Gamma Radiography Exposure Device. Despite an exhaustive search, the device could not be found. Such instances of radioactive materials changing hands puts question mark on the sincerity and integrity of AERB’s stated mission.

The news of radiation spread fast and International Atomic Energy Agency had become aware of the possibility of a serious radiation emergency at Mayapuri in New Delhi via media reports on April 9. It had also seen media reports of a fatality caused by exposure to radiation in Indian scrap metal yards and sought information. Accordingly, AERB sent full information under Incident Reporting System (IRS) as per mandatory requirement of the global nuclear watchdog and Illicit Trafficking Data Base (ITDB) of the agency. Department of Atomic Energy had confirmed the event, and the AERB had notified the IAEA that multiple Cobalt-60 sources had been located and secured.

The Cobalt 60 radiation tragedy has unearthed many issues and has brought up many systematic problems to the fore. It has become evident that our ports are porous to all kinds of waste and there are no scanners to detect what comes in, nuclear or otherwise. There seems to be no mechanism to track the illegal movement of radioactive matter through our transport system. Scrapyard dealers too suffer from lack of knowledge about safety norms, procedures and techniques to handle such waste. Moreover it is well known that India is one of the largest waste importing country. All types of waste are imported into India. Government data reveals that India even imports prohibited wastes like clinical waste, incineration ash, municipal waste and e-waste, all of which exceeds 50 lakh tonnes annually. India with a population of nearly 1.2 billion, human life has never been a premium in India Thousands die every year due to easily avoidable causes such as stampedes at temples, willful flouting of road safety rules particularly by state-run buses, people touching live electric wires left loose by government utilities and drowning in open manholes of sewage pipelines. Unfortunately, when the Mayapuri incident was reported, everybody got involved in a blame game and buck passing as usual. Mayapuri incident and related first death in India because of radiation poisoning calls for reevaluating the tracking and monitoring of such radioactive waste and also fixing responsibility for any radiation disaster. The Mayapuri-Delhi University case is an example where even people who should be aware of the risks were callous.

Business Negotiations Related to Piracy Control in Cinematographic Work

Introduction

Business negotiations usually refer to an interactive process between two or more parties seeking to find common grounds on an issue or issues of mutual interest or dispute. In which the involved parties seek to make or find a mutually acceptable agreement that will be honoured by all the parties concerned. Negotiation is the process of two individuals or groups reaching joint agreement about differing needs. In business negotiations, negotiators jointly search for a multidimensional space and then agree to a single point in that space. Negotiation applies knowledge from the fields of communications, sales, marketing, psychology, sociology, politics, and conflict resolution. Negotiations related to tackling copyright infringement in cinematographic works are complex as there exists a variety of copyrights in a single work and many a times these are overlapping. Cinematographic work includes any work expressed by any process analogous to cinematography, whether or not accompanied by a soundtrack. Copyright infringement surged in the entertainment industry after the advent of the Video Home System (VHS), home video equipment. In numerous countries, the lack of a minimum regulatory framework for the sector does not foster the organisation of the professional and economic environment.

According to the Lex Orbis Intellectual Property Resource Center, copyright, is a bundle of rights, which grants protection to the unique expression of ideas. Copyright is a negative right and the owner of a copyright gets the right to prevent others from copying his or her work without his or her consent towards a commercial end. However, at the same time it gives to the author an exclusive right for the commercial exploitation of his work. Copyright infringement in cinematographic work occurs when anyone who sells, acquires, copies or distributes copyrighted materials without permission. Downloading a movie without paying for it is morally and ethically no different to walking into a store and stealing a DVD (Digital Video Disk) off the shelf. Sharing it through peer-to-peer applications or posting it on a forum for downloading is akin to giving illegal copies to thousands and millions of people for free. Piracy is committed in many ways, including via the internet by downloading and swapping movies, and on the streets, where illegally duplicated VCDs (Video Compact Disk) and DVDs are sold by shopowners and street vendors. Illegal downloads of popular films are nearly as numerous as box office visits. A French anti-piracy association, The Association against Audiovisual Piracy (ALPA) analysed peer to peer traffic in France between November 2007 and June 2008 and concluded that a number of popular films had been downloaded so many times that the phenomenon could endanger the entire film industry (Cheng, 2008).

Regarding the extent of piracy in India, Indian Film Industry estimated a loss of Rs. 1700 crore ($360 million) in revenue annually and the Indian government loses Rs. 750 crore in taxes because of piracy. A report by the US-India Business Council estimates a loss of $4 billion to the Indian Entertainment Industry due to piracy (Kapoor 2009). The main reasons behind copyright piracy are poor enforcement and lack of awareness on copyright matters. The copyright laws of India are as good as those of many advanced countries in Europe and America. To tackle the scourge of piracy, India is actively negotiating with United States to minimise the loss suffered by Indian Film Industry.

The Issue of Piracy and the strategies of anti-piracy

In the recent years, bollywood has attracted a great deal of international interest, in terms of revenue. Indian Film Industry is still a small but gradually expanding part of the international market which churns out the largest number of films every year (an average of 800 films per year) where the gate receipts for domestic sales are to the tune of US$ 869 million. Even, the government has realised the true potential of bollywood and has formally granted it the status of an ‘industry’ in 2001 (Timm Neu, 2007). Indian expatriates and the worldwide embrace of Indian cultural products (including food, music, spirituality, and exercise method-yoga) had created a strong new market for Indian films outside India. Indian artists have had a fair amount of success abroad. Indian music director, A. R. Rehman, for example, has joined hands with Andrew Llyod Webber in his musical production, Bombay Dreams, co-produced by Shekhar Kapur. The widespread success of movies with crossover appeal such as "Monsoon Wedding" has driven a spate of film co-production and film development deals and cross-border distribution agreements between India and the United States. The natural synergies between bollywood (the world's largest film industry by volume), and Hollywood (the world's largest film industry by revenue) are finally being realised.

However, increasing levels of counterfeiting and piracy threaten these partnerships. It's been estimated that the Indian entertainment industry is losing some 80% of its revenue to counterfeiting and piracy, and this directly threatens the very viability and existence of these industries. The true cost to the Indian economy is undoubtedly much greater than that. For every rupee or dollar lost, there is less revenue to hire people in the Indian industry, fewer Indians paid to distribute films, records, and entertainment software, and money lost by a whole host of Indian industries that support entertainment (Parekh and Parikh 2001).

To counter this growing menace of copyright infringement related to cinematographic works, India is negotiating with United States through various channels. One amongst them is United States- India Business Council. US-India Business Council has launched the "Bollywood-Hollywood Initiative" with the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). The initiative includes a groundbreaking survey financed by USIBC to determine the true cost of piracy and counterfeiting to the Indian entertainment industry; a push to ensure India's adoption of Optical Disc Legislation to combat piracy; a campaign to raise public awareness of the detrimental affects of piracy to India. It is also a drive to US-India governmental cooperation in combating international, cross-border piracy - particularly of Indian films in the US and other countries as well as US films in India. USIBC has laid out an aggressive agenda for 2009 to stem the scourge of DVD piracy and strengthen U.S.-India media and entertainment collaboration (USIBC, Piracy Report 2008).

India’s policy to counter copyright infringement focused on balancing developmental concerns with the need for promoting innovations. India viewed protection of innovative material as a tool for economic development and restricted the scope and term of patents. India’s negotiating history shows that while trade threats were important in leading India to initiate changes in its policy globally, domestic level policy change took place only with the mobilisation of a domestic constituency that favoured change. United States’ position was that India could object to any aspect of the treaty, but did not need to refuse discussing the issue of IPRs altogether. This appeared at the time to be rational to Indian leaders and India revised its patent policy to confirm to TRIPs (Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights) and agreed to include IPR in the WTO (World Trade Organisation). WTO Member states are, through TRIPS, obligated to comply with the Berne Convention of 1886 as amended in 1979, which protects literary and artistic works. India is pressing hard vis-a-vis United States to establish sound and productive business practices through India-United States Business Council (Rammanna, 2002).

So far, the response from Hollywood has been sympathetic because films from Hollywood too are facing the same problem of Illegal downloads and pirated CD, DVD business proliferation. Moreover, The USIBC-FICCI (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry) Bollywood-Hollywood Initiative has raised expectations that the very real concerns over counterfeiting and piracy will be addressed, leading directly to the generation of additional jobs and revenue.

According to a survey on National Cinematography undertaken by UNESCO in 2000, only about 60 of a total of 102 countries producing films have a legal framework or official structures regarding this sector. The survey showed that authors’ rights are least protected in Asia. The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), representing the US majors whose various movie production and distribution subsidiaries command approximately 90 percent of the United States and Canadian box office namely, 20^th Century Fox, Warner Bros., Paramount, Sony Pictures, Walt Disney and Universal, loses US$2.5 billion yearly in potential copyright revenues due to film piracy, mainly in Asian countries, Mexico and the Russian Federation (UNESCO 2000). The global film industry is currently losing $3bn-$3.5bn per year due to illegal piracy operations (Frater 2003). To counter copyright infringement in cinematographic works, United States enacted The Family Entertainment and Copyright Act, a federal legislative act regarding copyright that became law in the United States in 2005. The Act consists of two subparts: the Artist's Rights and Theft Prevention Act of 2005, which increases penalties for copyright infringement and the Family Home Movie Act of 2005.

Reasons for Lack of Copyright Enforcement

The Indian Copyright Act, the first Indian legislation of its kind, was passed in 1914, and was mainly based on the U.K. Copyright Act of 1911. With the development of recording, broadcasting, television and other new technologies it became essential to update the copyright laws. As a result, the Copyright Act of 1957 ("the Act") was introduced in the Parliament. This law presently governs the copyright system in India. The Act has been amended in 1983, 1984, 1992, 1994 and 1999.

The legislation which can be invoked to counter film piracy in India is the Copyright Act, 1994. India is also signatory to two major copyright conventions, namely, The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works adopted in 1886, since then revised seven times and the Universal Copyright Convention adopted in Geneva in 1952. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 created the Special 301 mechanism, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) issues an annual Special 301 Report which "examines in detail the adequacy and effectiveness of intellectual property rights" in many countries around the world. India still remains on the Priority Watch List according to the (International Intellectual Property Alliance) IIPA Special 301 Report, 2009 (IIPA 2009). Even though the Indian Copyright Act 1994, which came into effect from May 10, 1995, provides strong enough provisions to convict a person or a group for copyright infringement but the procedural structure of the Indian system has always been a hurdle to deter piracy, because of poor policing and less number of suo moto raids. Moreover majority of police personnel and crime branch officials are not familiar with provisions of copyright act. The Police act only on a complaint by the witness in case and witness has to be available for all court hearings. This process is very time consuming as the court can take several years to decide a case. As a result the witness is not available for such a long time and the case gets dismissed. The Indian Judiciary has the onerous responsibility of interpreting the balance between private interests and public welfare. The judicial system is very slow and burdensome which makes copyright enforcement an even more difficult task. It takes a long time for the courts to bring cases to final judgment which affects not only the domestic copyright industry but also gives a reason to the international industry in not investing in India. Furthermore, public education and police education are pre-requisites for proper enforcement of copyright laws which will ultimately pave the way for healthy and innovative business strategies. Indian copyright act as amended in 1994 has now made copyright infringement a cognizable non-bailable offence (Kapoor 2009). And the situation has changed to an extent as the IIPA report, 2009 stated that, “The Indian Recording Industry, IMI, reports that relationships with the police have improved in 2008 and that 300 criminal cases were commenced. A study by the U.S.-India Business Council (USIBC), 2008 points out that India’s entertainment industry already generates more than $11 billion annually for the country, growing at a combined annual rate of over 18%. If piracy can be tackled, these industries will grow even faster and employ more Indian workers (ibid).

Effects of Piracy on Film Industry

Piracy threatens the very existence of film industry as millions of rupess are being siphoned off throgh illegal channels, by allowing thousands of people to view a film illegally, for free, at the click of a button, a pirates are damaging the revenue a film studio will receive from said film's ticket and DVD sales. By siphoning off millions of rupees piracy curbs the upcoming innovati9ons in film industry as increasingly less number of people opt for cinema as a medium of entertainment because everything is available on click of a button. Inherently the film industry, is a business and denying money to a business, therefore, amounts to its ultimate demise in the long run. Apart from physical piracy now a days stakes are especially high for entertainment companies as they sell more of their products online in the form of digital songs, movies and other intellectual property. Entertainment companies fear that internet piracy may be tougher for lawmakers to conceptualize. Movie piracy causes a total lost output for U.S. industries of $20.5 billion per year, thwarts the creation of about 140,000 jobs and accounts for more than $800 million in lost tax revenue (Ahrens 2006). Becoming a major issue for Hindi and English film industry, piracy is nowhere to stop. And to counter that, leading Bollywood studios such as Reliance Big Entertainment, Yash Raj Films, UTV Motion Pictures, Eros International and Studio 18 have joined hands with the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) to set up an anti-piracy coalition. It has been well recognised that Piracy is not a victimless crime, RAND report on Film Piracy, Organised Crime and Terrorism has clearly demonstrated that film piracy funds terrorist activity. There needs to be a strong legislative and enforcement response in tackling the issue of copyright theft. The enormity of the theft is perhaps not being understood and the current state of affairs of the film business is largely due to large scale consumption of pirated DVDs.

Development of Realism

Development of Realism from Medieval to Modern Times

The Realist tradition in western thought dates back to ancient Greece, particularly to the writings of Thucydides. The Classical Realism begins with Thucydides and to Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza and Rousseau. The insights that these Realists offered on how state leaders should behave are together grouped as doctrine of ‘reason of state’. The Writers were seen prescribing maxims on how to conduct their foreign policy so as to ensure the security of state. Most importantly, State, which is identified as key actor in international politics, must pursue power, and the duty of the statesman is to perfectly further the interests of State so as to perpetuate the life of state in a hostile environment. Classical Realism is fundamentally about the struggle for belonging, a struggle that is often violent. Patriotic virtue is required to survive in this historic battle between good and evil, a virtue which is in vogue ever since the treaty of Westphalia (1648).
Thucydides (460-406 BC) was the historian of the Peloponnesian war, a conflict between two great powers in ancient Greek world, Athens and Sparta. Thucydides’ explanation of the underlying cause of the war was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which it caused in Sparta is considered to be a classic example of the impact that the anarchical structure of international politics has on the behaviour of states.
Sparta’s national interest was survival and the changing distribution of power represented a direct threat to its existence. Thucydides makes it clear that Athens felt it compelled to acquire more and more power to preserve empire it had acquired. A dialogue between Athens and Sparta is known as ‘Melian dialogue’. What the Athenians are asserting over the Melians is logic of power politics. As the dialogue makes it clear, the Melians were forced to submit to the Realist Iron Law that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept”. According to Thucydides the logic of power politics has universal applicability. The seemingly endless cycle of war and conflict confirmed in the minds of 20th century classical realist the essential aggressive impulses in human nature.
Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), Machiavelli develops the Realist argument in its purest form. To comprehend Machiavelli fully, it is important to understand the series of cultural, economic, social and political changes that began in the 14th century called the Renaissance. The Renaissance signified a rebirth of the human spirit in the attainment of liberty, self confidence and optimism. Machiavelli is the first thinker in the history of political thought to think of territorial, national and sovereign state. He completely rejects the feudal conception of a complex hierarchy of relatively autonomous entities and for it substituted an all powerful authority which is supreme over all the institutions in society. Machiavelli is the first and clearest exponent of power politics. The individual according to Machiavelli is wicked, selfish, and egoistic, being essentially anti- social, anarchical, selfish, greedy, the individual who would forget the death of his father, but not the los of patrimony’. Machiavelli presumed that human nature remain constant, for history move in a cyclical manner, alternating between growth and decay, and ‘international politics’ in Machiavelli’s view is an independent realm with laws of its own, and these laws of Political Realism are dramatically different from the moral laws that some would apply to politics.
The novelty in Machiavelli’s writings was his attitude towards religion and morality, which distinguished him from all those who preceded him. As a political tool, princes and rulers were to use religion in their power struggles effectively. Religion was good only if it produced order. Machiavelli’s attitude towards religion is purely utilitarian. It was a social force and didn’t have any spiritual connotation. Machiavelli’s vision was dominated by classical ideas, especially with regard to his key idea, (virtue), by which he meant the masculine and war-like qualities. A civic religion for Machiavelli should instill fear and respect for authority and help in the inculcation of military valor. For Machiavelli a successful ruler or state was one which would be able to acquire, maintain, consolidate and increase power. The survival and the preservation of commonwealth was his prime concern which is also valid as of today. Machiavelli didn’t condone the use of immoral or wicked ways. To him, the end is important, which could be attained by any means. For him, politics is amoral. His amorality implied that in specific circumstances, a ruler would have to resort to tactics that were not considered strictly moral. Unlike traditional political theory, which contended that ethical conduct was desirable for it would bring about moral elevation, Machiavelli was too realistic to overlook the irony of political situation. Machiavelli’s Realism thus attempts to overcome moral inhibitions in pursuit of self interest.
The philosophy of Realism which prevailed throughout the 18th and 19th centuries was revived after the Second World War. Hans Morgenthau was the chief exponent of the Realist Theory. Morgenthau gave theoretical orientation to Realism. The Realist approach was transformed into a distinct school of thought. That is why reference is inevitably made to Morgenthau when there is a discussion of realism in international politics. According to Morgenthau the master key is the concept of ‘interest’ defined in terms of ‘power’. This approach focuses attention on units which are the main actors in international politics: the states.
The essence of Morgenthau’s theory of Realism is contained in 6 principals of Political Realism enumerated by Morgenthau himself.
The first is that politics is governed by objective laws which have their roots in human nature. As s such, our efforts should be to ascertain facts and interpret those through reason. It assumes that the nature of a foreign policy can be appraised only through the examination of political activities and their possible consequence. According to Morgenthau, we must find out what the statesmen have actually done and then make our guess on basis of findings as to what the objectives of the statesmen have been.
Secondly, the main element of Political Realism is the concept of national interest which Morgenthau defines in terms of power. Thus the Realist Theory of International Politics does not care for what is desirable and possible for a particular nation under the concrete circumstances of time and place.
Thirdly, Political Realism does not take a fixed or determined meaning of interest. It is Morgenthau’s belief that environment plays an important role in shaping the interests that determine political action.
Fourthly, Political Realism, though not indifferent to morality, implies that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulations, but that they must be modified to suit the exigencies of time and place.
Fifthly, Political Realism refuses to accept any identification between the moral aspirations of a particular nation and the moral laws which govern the universe. And finally, political realism maintains the autonomy of political sphere.
Political Realism parts company with other schools because they impose non – political standards of thought and action on political affairs.
The intellectual exercise of articulating a unified theory of realism has been criticized by writers who are both symptomatic to and critical of the tradition. The belief that there is not one Realism, but many, leads logically to delineation of different types of Realism. Modern Realism which typically takes the first great debate between the scholars of the inter war period and a new wave of scholars who began to enter the field immediately after the Second World War as its point of departure. After the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s landmark text ‘Theory of International Politics’ a structural or neo-realism came to the fore. Kenneth waltz in his ‘Theory of International Politics’ says that states work in an anarchical environment, and anarchy leads to logic of self-help in which states seek to maximize their security. In this anarchic situation, the most stable distribution of power is bipolarity. Since Kenneth Waltz’s states seek to maximize security and thus they are Defensive States, in other worlds Kenneth Waltz’s Realism is often described as Defensive Realism. A different account of the power system that operates in the anarchical system is provided by John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism. Mearsheimer argues that there are no satisfied or status- quoist states, rather all states continuously searching opportunities to gain more and more power. Indeed the ideal situation, although, virtually impossible to achieve is to be the global hegemon. Thus Mearsheimer advocates that states are primarily power maximizers and in turn, are offensive in nature.
There are other various varieties of Realism which are mainly responses to structural realism-:
Neo-classical Realism as advocated by Schweller (1997) and Zakaria (1998) which says that systemic account of world politics by structural Realism is incomplete, emphasizes on focusing on unit level variables such as how power is perceived, and how leadership is exercised. Rational choice realism by Grieco (1993) Krasner (1999) use advanced social science methodologies such as Game theory in order to test realist hypothesis. Advocates of this position claim that institutions matter however they exert less of causal force than neo liberals contend. We find that realism lends itself to any number of possible consequences. Realism can lend itself to an expansionist foreign policy or to appeasement. The great virtue of realism is that it can explain almost every foreign policy event. Its great defect is that it tends to do this after the act, not before’ (Vazquez1998).

Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma-- John herz

John Herz brings out the idealist assumptions and their failure in the hard reality of security dilemma and persistence of realism in the sphere of international politics. Since the beginning of known history men, nations and their leaders have grappled with the ‘security dilemma’. This urge for security from being attacked, subjected has driven states to strive to acquire more and more power and this in turn renders the others more insecure. The two major ways of reacting to this situation are-
Political Realism
Political Idealism
Political Realism recognizes the phenomena which are connected with the urge for security and competition for power. Political idealism assumes that a harmony exists, or can be realized between the individual concern and general good. Power is something that can easily be channelized, diffused and utilized for the common good and it can be ultimately eliminated altogether from political relationships. John Herz has analysed nationalism and internationalism with regards to their basic idealist assumptions and their failure in the world of realist phenomena.
Idealist Nationalism
Rise of sovereign nation states gave push to the idea and ideal of a system of equal, free and self determining nationalities and all living peacefully side by side in harmonious mutual relations. Thus Idealism stands in contrast to nationalism that developed with the rise of exclusive, aggressive, expansionist and imperialistic national policies which is called ‘Integral Nationalism’, which represents political realism in its extreme. Idealist nationalism had its source in the doctrine of national self-determination that produced the idea of individual self-determination. Thus the fundamental rights of nationalities were considered to be the same as those of man, namely freedom from interference and oppression. It was assumed that once such freedom had been achieved in a system of self-determining nation-states; there would be no longer any reason or justification for international friction and war. But this idealistic assumption and the unanswered question as to whom these nationalities were to do battle with were soon answered by history. Not perceiving the common enemy, they would turn against each other. This turning against each other as one of its major reasons was the security dilemma of politically disintegrated units and their ensuing competition for power. Nationalities having established themselves as nation-states inevitably became competing units. How did it happen that earlier nationalism, with its vision of international peace and harmony could have so completely overlooked this phenomena.
Some explanation can be found in Political Idealism itself, its inclination to expect the millennium ‘totally and radically different situation’. Humanitarian Nationalism expected the golden age of international brotherhood to come true once nationalities were set free to determine their fate in liberty. But the mechanical balance of power politics of absolutist cabinets was more suitable for safeguarding peaceful relations than was a policy based on emotional impulses, aims and claims of nation-states.
Idealist Internationalism
Among movements expressive of idealist internationalism, Herz has accounted for those movements which were genuinely Universalist. According to Herz, French or Bolshevik revolutions were conceived as a world embracing development and such movements were truly world revolutionary in the strict sense. Puritan revolution in England and American Revolution were considered as a cause of one single nation. But world revolutionary appeal and propaganda were essence of French revolution. The revolution was considered as world religion and it was France’s mission to impose upon humanity. However, while overestimating the importance of revolutionary movements and sympathizing groups abroad, one vastly underestimating the hostile reaction the revolution was bound to evoke in a Europe still largely feudal and monarchist. When the people of Europe failed to respond to the message, disillusioned revolutionaries claimed the right to force them to be free. The declaration of national convention of April 17, 1793 stated that France will not interfere in any way in the affairs of other powers- marked the real end of world revolutionary period and beginning of national real-politik. The revolution had now become the revolution of one single country.
The history of Workers’ International is yet another confirmation of the prevalence of power-political realist phenomena over utopian idealism. The idea of a classless society, which was to result from the concerted international action of the proletarians of all countries, combined internal and international utopianism in one comprehensive structure. The Second International conceived the task of different socialist parties as one of opposing capitalistic wars and turning them into struggles for the overthrow of capitalistic system. But despite its apparent strength on the eve of world war, the Second International proved impotent in 1914. The great majority of Workers’ representatives voted for war. The allegation f self-defense was indicative of profound dilemma connected with the security factor. Realistic appraisal of power phenomena led the Soviet Regime (under Stalin) to abandon its world revolutionary ideology. Stalinism adopted the Realist fact that one country in which revolution had succeeded was forced to live in same world with its counter revolutionary neighbours. Soviet Union now acts with at least the same degree of insistence on self preservation, sovereignty, security and power considerations as do other countries. Whatever appeared as Soviet Internationalism has in reality became subservient to a national cause. Thus it shows that security and power dilemma would have its impact on actual policies in a collectivized world as it has had in capitalistic and pre-capitalistic worlds.
Internationalism in the field of political thought has commonly taken the form of a general idealism, relatively independent of socio-political creeds. Its nature is apparent from the assumption that international integration in certain fields of society will inevitably be followed and implemented by the socio-political integration of mankind in one community. War and power politics are considered as anachronisms. But this simply overlooks the opposite tendency growing out of the technical interdependence of the sovereign units in the world. Faced with growing interdependence and also with security dilemma, their attempted way-out is to expand their individual power, economically and strategically. In view of the security dilemma of competing powers, attempts to reduce power by mutual agreement, for instance through disarmament are bound to fail.

Failure of idealist internationalism, connected with economic or laissez-faire liberalism
The assumption that wherever and whenever the trading class with its commercial interests came to the fore, it developed an international pacifist ideology based on the assumption that once the irrational, monopolistic and nationalistic obstacles to free exchange of goods among nations were eliminated, all nations would readily realize their common interest in peace. England in 17th century was filled with pacifist ideology of commercialism. But it was economic as well as in the political realm that realist obstacles to the implementation of laissez-faire idea were found. Exactly as in the domestic sphere, accumulation of economic power by monopolies has prevented a genuinely free enterprise system from functioning, so in the international realm complete freedom of exchange could not prevail over the tendencies of monopoly and exclusiveness. Thus tariffs became powerful instruments for preservation of vested economic interests in actual war as those of armaments manufacturers and alleged business interests induced governments as a pretext for power politics. Even if Capitalism had not developed inherent oligarchic and imperialist trends, the security dilemma inherent in the system of sovereign nation-states has presented Capitalism from forming a genuinely free enterprise system on an international basis.
Arguments by collectivists
According to collectivists, in a structure of planned economies the causes of international friction and wars would be eliminated. However laissez-faire liberal F.A.Hayek criticizes the collectivist argument by saying that if the resources of different nations are treated as exclusive properties of these nations, they inevitably become the source of friction and envy between whole nations. From the above analysis, it seems that the two extremes- utopian idealism and realism were the only existing as possible approaches to the problem of politics. But there have also been possibilities of synthesis i.e. combination of political realism and political idealism. Herz suggests calling such an approach Realist Liberalism. The term ‘Realist’ indicates that the system or policy in question must start from and accept the factual insights of political realism.
Term ‘liberalism’ here is broader than the liberalism of 19th century (free trade and constitutionalists). It includes terms such as liberal, democratic, humanitarian and socialist. It is not pledged to any specific economic theory or to any particular theory of best form of government. In short, it opposes all the natural forces and trends which are the direct or indirect consequences of the security and power dilemma. Thus, realist liberalism is the theory and practice of ‘realisable ideal’. According to Herz, a system of collective security, as the realization of the balance principle, came closer to the practical realization in the inter-war period. The security dilemma today (1950) is perhaps more clear cut than it was ever before. It would appear that from the point which concentration of power has never achieved, it can only either proceed to actual global domination by one power unit or recede into diffusion and disintegration.

Behaviouralism- a movement in Political Science

Behaviouralism
Partly as a reaction against the traditional approaches and partly in search of more ‘Scientific’ knowledge about politics, political scientists have in recent times come out with a variety of approaches. The first breakthrough came with the emergence of the ‘behavioural movement’ in political science.
Behaviouralism, or the behavioural approach to the analysis and explanation of political phenomena, is particularly associated with the work of American political scientists after the Second World War, but its origins can be traced back to the works of Graham Wallas (Human Nature in Politics) and Arthur Bentley (The Process of Government), both published as early as 1908. Both Wallas and Bentley were inclined to lay greater emphasis on the informal processes of politics and less on political institutions in isolation. Wallas sought to introduce a New Realism in political studies in light of new findings of Contemporary Psychology. The new psychology had revealed that man was not a rational creature and that his political actions were not totally guided by reason and self interest. Wallas therefore insisted on exploring facts and evidence for understanding human nature and its manifestations in human behaviour.
Arthur Bentley, on the other hand, a pioneer of group approach to politics, primarily sought not to describe political activity, but to provide for new tools of investigation. Greatly inspired by Sociology, he proceeded to undertake a study of the role of pressure groups, political parties, elections and public opinion in the political process.
Charles E Merriam was another pioneer of behavioural approach. He is also famous as the founder of the ‘Chicago School’ which made substantial contribution to the behavioural movement. In the article ‘The Present State of The Study Of Politics’ published in American political science review (1921) and in his book ‘New Aspects of Politics’ (1925) Merriam criticized contemporary political science for its lack of scientific rigour. In his presidential address to American ‘Political Science Association’ (1925) Merriam exhorted political scientists to look at political behaviour as one of the essential objects of inquiry.
George E. Catlin in his ‘Science and Method of Politics’ (1927) advanced the case for a value-free pure science. He treated ‘power’ as essence of politics and argued that analysis of power should not be inclined in favour of any particular value-system.
Harold d. lasswell, (1902-78) his celebrated work ‘Politics: Who Gets What, When and How’ (1936) proved to be a landmark in the empirical approach to politics as the study and analysis of power.
Despite these early attempts, Behaviouralism in political science was systematically developed only after the Second World War, particularly through the writings of American Political Scientists. David B. Truman, Robert Dahl, Evron M.kirkpatrick, David Easton, Heinz Eulau etc. are the most prominent personalities of Behavioural movement in political science.
Behaviouralism as such came to be understood as something wider than the study of political behaviour, yet political behaviour was its main focus. Behaviouralism as a movement in political science did not remain confined to the study of individual based political behaviour, but developed into a set of orientations, procedures and methods of analysis. In practice it embraced all that lends a scientific character to the modern political science. According to David Easton, the intellectual foundations of Behaviouralism consist of eight major tenets.
Regularities: Discoverable uniformities in political behaviour which can be expressed in theory like statements.
Verification: Validity of such theory like statements can be verified.
Techniques: Means for acquiring and interpreting data.
Quantification: Precision in the recording of data.
Values: Objective scientific inquiry has to be value free or value neutral.
Systematization: Close interrelationship between theory and research.
Pure Science: Directed towards forging a link between theoretical understanding of politics and application of theory to practical problem- solving.
Integration: Integration of political science with other social sciences.
Thus Behaviouralism came to accord primacy to higher degree of reliability vis-à-vis higher degree of generality. In short, Behaviouralism focussed on micro level situations rather than attempting macro level generalizations.

Book Review- Eternal Vigilance? 50 Years of CIA edited by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, Christopher Andrew

The book Eternal Vigilance? 50 years of the CIA, seeks to explore some of the major themes in CIA history. In February 1947 the White House submitted to Congress a bill for the unification of the armed forces which, in its 102nd clause, provided for the establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency. Congress approved the bill on 26 July, 1947 and the National Security Act came into force on 19 September and the following day the modest Central Intelligence Group gave way to the mighty United States Central Intelligence Agency. No single volume can seek to cover all, or even most of the CIA's diverse activities during its first 50 years as the present book on the subject has attempted to do. America’s march towards a systematic post-war permanent intelligence system, made up of CIA, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY and the intelligence organizations of the military services, remain significant elements of American intelligence history. But the fact remains that after passing through a series of ups and downs between 1861 and 1941, the United States finally came of age in Second World War and that henceforth the only road open to it was one leading to larger, more sophisticated and better integrated intelligence systems.
Tthe CIA owed its essential nature to an Act of Congress and on Capitol Hill fear of Soviet Union had not yet taken root. Pearl Harbor was the burning issue there. While Congress which in later years sometimes demanded a more restricted role for CIA showed a broader appreciation of the need for expanded intelligence. The creators of CIA were seeking to strengthen America’s capacity for free thought and independent action.
Regarding relationship between American and Dutch Intelligence, very little has been published in Netherlands, and almost nothing in English. The present Dutch Intelligence community consists of an Internal Security Service (BVD) and a military Intelligence Service (MID). As regards BVD, this internal security service was established in 1949 by confidential Royal decree. Despite recurrent American disappointment with Dutch foreign intelligence, it was interesting enough that relationship between the two agencies was generally close. Further the most significant contribution during the Second World War was to demonstrate the potential significance of all fields of science- from Biomedicine to meteorology to national defense. As Ronald Doel and Allan Needell pointed out that establishment of scientific intelligence within CIA in the immediate post-war period was at best a mixed success. Military intelligence agencies resisted often unsuccessfully the intrusions of civilian strategic analysts. The ethical lapses of CIA medical specialists in “Artichoke” and “MKULTRA” mind control experiments ranked among the most troubling violations of national trust. Finally, the success of CIA science specialists in developing greatly improved remote monitoring means by the late 1950’s reduced their reliance on military intelligence and helped bring about a further consolidation of scientific resources in the Agency’s new Directorate of Science and Technology (created in 1963).
As for as the Soviet threat is concerned vis-à-vis CIA, the book brings out the essence of Soviet influence on the working of CIA. The CIA though originally not envisaged as a counter force to contain so-called Communist expansionism became increasingly dominated by the desire to outwit Soviet influence. Around 50 National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) were produced each year. Those dealing with the Soviet Union were the NIE-11 series. The important feature of this estimating process was that it favored the CIA. The responsibility for producing national estimates rested with the Board of the Office of National Estimates (ONE). Although ONE was notionally separate from CIA it shared the same offices in Langley, Virginia and its personnel often recruited from the CIA. In the estimates on Soviet strategic forces, ONE had a long standing distrust of military estimators. They were fortified with the view that it was shared by the most substantial figure in the defense establishment- Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. McNamara had become disillusioned with the continuous promotion of what he considered to be exaggerated claims about Soviet potential. The book has elaborately dwelt on a wide range of topics ranging from downing of U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, ICBM deployment, ABM deployment and SALT negotiations. In the course of time, the validity of National Intelligence Estimates began to be challenged, fragmented intelligence community was struggling to produce an estimate that was subject to inherent uncertainties.
Michael Donovan in the chapter entitled “National Intelligence and the Iranian Revolution” considers Iranian Revolution as agency’s greatest predictive and reporting failures. Senior policy makers in particular have cited a lack of intelligence to explain their own belated and limited response to the crisis. On the last day of 1977, President Jimmy Carter declared Iran to be an ‘island of stability in one of the most troubled areas of the world’. A week after Carter’s speech the government controlled press in Iran published an article entitled ‘Iran and Red and Black Colonialism’ which ridiculed the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In response to this violent demonstrations were staged in the Holy city of Qom, marking the beginning of Iranian Revolution. Yet in November 1978, did the foreign policy establishment in Washington become aware that the regime in Teheran was faltering. However, prior to 1978, there was no intelligence that predicted the fall of shah. The nature of the Iranian power structure tended to obfuscate sources of information that might have been available in other countries.
The CIA’s economic function grew in response to the undeserved need for more reliable estimates about Soviet Bloc economies and then the economies of the less developed countries and newly independent nations of the Third World, decades before the international financial institutions began to accumulate impressive data about such problems. Government officials unanimously praise the value of economic intelligence gathered by Agency, even if the flashes of special insight are unpredictable or episodic. The marketplace produces such information as is helpful in achieving commercial interests. Outside information can even be distorted. The Soviet Union never accurately reported its defense spending. Finally, US Government may want to mould information to fit its own special requirements. Thus the book has very nicely pointed out the actual working of CIA. How the Agency’s bureaucratic structures expanded with the passage of time has been aptly brought to the fore by Rhodri Jeffreys Jones and Christopher Andrew.
On the question of accountability vis-à-vis CIA and other Government agencies, by constitutional design, the Executive branch of government in the United States is required to share its powers with the legislative and judicial branches. This legislative monitoring or review is usually referred to by the awkward tem ‘oversight’. For the most part, though, the government has abided by the founding principle of power-sharing, though its precise form has always been dependent on the personalities and conditions of the times. Some events have compelled a greater concentration of power in the hands of the Executive, for the sake of swift action and secrecy. Mindful of the need for improved supervision over the CIA and its companion agencies, legislators attempted from time to time to craft new congressional controls. However, these initiatives were always defeated as a majority of legislators remained content to abide by the rule of exceptionalism for America’s secret agencies.
Not unlike the other segments of the vast CIA bureaucracy, the fortunes of the CIA historical programme have been closely tied to the personal interest paid to them by the senior menagement officials. Most CIA officers and decision makers, although they use historical analogies everyday, are basically ahistorical. For many CIA officials, resources and personnel were and are better placed in other areas. Generally, history per se has a very low Agency priority as the book has spelt out. The study on CIA’s own effort to understand and document its past traces the development of CIA history programme from its origins under the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) General Walter Bedell Smith in 1950 to its status under DCI judge William Webster in 1991. What becomes strikingly clear in this brief study of the origins and development of the CIA history programme is the general ignorance and misunderstanding on the part of most CIA officials of history’s value to the agency. Despite its current strengthened position, there is little to suggest that Agency policy makers are using history insightfully. Whether or not the Agency has learned its history lessons remains to be seen.
Some of the CIA’s notorious errors, like Roosevelt’s failings before Pearl Harbor, have been closely related to misunderstandings of intelligence history. The disastrous overestimation of the efficacy of covert action by Allen Dulles and his senior operations officers during the 1950’s, culminating in the debacle of the Bay of Pigs, derived from a false comparison between wartime special operations behind enemy lines and paramilitary operations in peacetime. That false comparison was reinforced by superficial analysis of the apparently easy overthrow of the Iranian Prime Minister, Muhammad Mossadeq, in 1953 and of the Guatemalan president, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, a year later. More careful study of such successes would have shown that they would not be easily replicable in future.
The book related to the CIA is “The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science &Technology” by Jeffrey T Richelson. This book particularly focuses on the working of CIA’s Department of Science & Technology. The issues spelt out in the book “50 years of CIA” like the ethical lapses of CIA medical specialists in ‘Artichoke’ and ‘MKULTRA’ mind control experiments, administering LSD to scientists without their knowledge (one committed suicide as a result), employing cats as bugging devices, have been more broadly discussed in the book by Richelson. The book also offers a wealth of anecdotes, giving readers a rare look at top-secret operations and spy games of the cold war. This is a nice book for those interested in the largely unsung heroes who have enabled the CIA to work so effectively.
The book 50 Years of CIA is an interesting account about the past, present and future of Central Intelligence Agency. I personally find it very much insightful which is not self- praising or only presenting the viewpoint of United States, but a well drafted document which has objective approach in its entirety. “Eternal Vigilance?” is an edited book which has contributions from various types of scholars who are not in any way seem to promote the interests of Western world alone. This is the most significant factor which has particularly increased my interest. The one who wants to have significant information on the working of Cia , then the search for an authentic account ends here.

Book review- Domestic Society and International Cooperation by Jeffrey W. Knopf

The field of international relations has long since moved beyond the traditional ‘billiard ball model’ that once dominated the discipline. Few scholars today would take issue with the assertion that "domestic politics matters" when it comes to explaining foreign policy. This book shows how peace movements affected US decisions to enter nuclear arms control talks during the Cold War. The book contends that many major theories of international relations adopt an unduly narrow view of domestic politics. Domestic society is generally treated as a source of constraints on foreign policy makers. This book builds on the ‘domestic structure approach’ to explaining foreign policy. It demonstrates that popular campaigns against nuclear arms race had a significant impact on United States arms control policy. The case studies undertaken in this book show that societal activism can be the trigger to foreign policy initiatives that most analysts would regard as consistent with national interests and can serve as a direct stimulus to the development of new state preferences.
This book explores that what impact, if any, peace movements had on United States decisions to seek nuclear arms control with Soviet Union. The case studies taken in this work are;
• Talks on a nuclear test ban in 1958
• Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 1958
• Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in 1982.
By demonstrating the importance of public protest and citizen activism, Jeffrey Knopf shows how state preferences for cooperation can be shaped from below. Grassroots-based campaigns can be a direct stimulus to decisions to seek cooperation. Most studies of cooperation adopt a fairly top down perspective, coming under one of three categories. Some derive preferences from system level factors, meaning that they treat domestic arena as a source of constraints. Others adopt a statesmen centered perspective. Finally, some focus on societal inputs, but emphasise dominant economic interests or technical elites. The dependent variable adopted in the case studies is ‘willingness to cooperate’ and independent variable is ‘anti-nuclear weapons protests’ and control variables for this study are military balance, state of political relations and domestic economic conditions. Thus domestic structure approach identifies those aspects of country’s political institutions and culture that could provide access for societal actors and indicates which kind of coalition parameters would prove most useful. A wide range of work on domestic sources of US foreign policy highlights three key institutions: regular, national elections; an independent legislature and a large decentralized bureaucracy. However, existing work in domestic structure approach has not specified the circumstances under which opportunities for citizens’ groups to gain access through these institutions are most favorable. To overcome this Jeffrey Knopf has identified three causal mechanisms through which a citizens’ campaign could gain leverage on arms policy, each of which corresponds to one of the institutions mentioned above, involve generating electoral pressure, changing coalitions in Congress, and feeding ideas in bureaucracy.
Earlier top-down approaches are not wrong, rather, incomplete in explaining impact of public protests. In the two Eisenhower cases, there were both constraints and a direct stimulus. Bureaucratic actors, primarily the military and atomic weapons complex, served as a constraint across both Eisenhower terms. From a more radical perspective, these actors could also be viewed as representatives of societal elite. At the same time, though, Eisenhower’s second term saw a shift toward a preference for cooperation, arising in part through a direct stimulus from below, so Eisenhower policy cannot be understood without incorporating this role of domestic society as well. At no point of time Eisenhower administration have an absolute preference for either cooperation or defection. Mechanism 3, where arguments connected with the rise of a citizens’ movement are used by the actors inside the administration had the greatest direct impact. Mechanism 2, in which the efforts of activist groups interact with those of elites, had an important stage setting effect in this case. The contacts between activists and major political figures and the ability of groups like SANE (committee for a sane nuclear policy) to mobilize well-known figures from other walks of life behind the test ban objective made testing an object of ongoing political and media attention that distinguished it from other possible subjects of arms control talks.
In the Nixon case, domestic actors both at the grassroots and elite level, probably are best characterized as constraint. SALT had been placed on the agenda in the Johnson years, largely in response to international developments. When Nixon tried to postpone talks to gain leverage on Soviet Union, domestic constraints forced Nixon to return to arms talks. Here too, grassroots actors still mattered but more in restoring an earlier preference for cooperation. SALT is the only case of serious arms talks during the cold war in which a major surge in citizen activism did not predate the start of talks. Mechanism 2, congressional coalition was the primary process at work. Mechanism 3, bureaucratic pathway control further reinforced this process. Bureaucratic leaks to the media raised the expectations that arms talks would begin soon, thereby accentuating the president’s problems. Mechanism 1, the electoral pathway, did not factor in the decision to enter SALT talks. Though to some extent administration was moved by electoral considerations, it was not responding to existing protest movements. Although domestic pressure is significant in this case, its impact differs in an important way from that exerted by the test ban and freeze movements. There was no major push from below driving the government into arms talks. When Nixon and Kissinger entered office they had already accepted the idea that arms talks would be a tool of US policy. They just wanted to delay talks to gain leverage on Soviet behaviour in other areas and they wanted to get Congressional support for new US strategic programmes so as to improve the nuclear balance. Though elites played a greater role in initiating pressure in this case, they gained much of their leverage from a wider peace movement that was starting to show an interest on nuclear weapon issues. Knopf assigns a weaker but still significant role to domestic factors in explaining the Nixon Administration’s decision to push forward the SALT I talks. Yet given the absence of a grassroots anti-nuclear movement during this period, even Knopf‘s modest claims for the role of citizen’s activism seem exaggerated in this case.
Finally, the Reagan years provide the best example of a direct stimulus from the grassroots. The nuclear freeze movement swept the country like a wildfire. The decision to seek cooperation thus emerged mainly from the bottom up. This pattern across the cases suggests that the different views of the role of domestic politics are not mutually exclusive. The anti-nuclear weapons movement of 1980’s activated in a way where mechanism 1 created electoral incentives for raising the place of arms restraint on national agenda. It also interacted with divisions among political elites, thus bringing mechanism 2 into play and promoted Congressional efforts to get Reagan to give less emphasis on increasing US strength and more preference for achieving mutual restraint. Thus mass electoral pressure and coalition shifts brought arms control policy at the national agenda. However, Congressional action would not have taken the same course without the pressures exerted by freeze movement. It was the rise of freeze movement that first encouraged many Congressional members in the house to take up the issue of arms control. As compared to the freeze resolution put in the house, the alternative SALT, initially favoured by administration lacked grassroots support and of course, not preferred by many elites as well. Congress thus did not have much impact on administration policy but freeze movement was instrumental in bringing this change in the posture of Reagan administration.
The Soviet Union certainly tried to take advantage of the growing citizens’ movement in United States and Europe. Soviets took no concrete actions that offered a promise of mutual advantage, limiting them instead to rhetorical endorsements meant purely to serve Soviet interests. More importantly, Reagan began trying to demonstrate a commitment to arms control immediately after United States defence build up had borne fruit. Reagan administration had tried to forestall talks unless and until United States achieved its own strong defences against Soviet armaments. Efforts to proclaim a willingness to cooperate on arms control reached a new peak in early 1984. Despite the fact that Soviets had walked out of negotiations less than two months earlier, Reagan in January 1984 made a speech in which he argued that the build up of US military has placed the United States “in its strongest position in years” , and US government could now afford to be forthcoming in arms control talks. Thus the nuclear disarmament breakthroughs of the Reagan era--the INF Treaty (which eliminated intermediate range nuclear missiles from Europe) and the START I Treaty (which reduced United States and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals) resulted from the Reagan administration’s nuclear buildup of the 1980s.
This book by Jeffrey Knopf ‘domestic society and International Cooperation’ provides useful insights into cooperation theory by emphasizing that domestic public opinion can also act as a source of formation of social values which in the long run influence foreign policy. Most scholarship assumes that state policies on pursuing international cooperation are set by national leaders, in response either to international conditions, or to their own interests and ideas. Whereas, this book explores the fact that ordinary citizens can make a difference in world politics in general and promoting international cooperation in particular. However, Knopf do not entirely resolve the problem that societal activism can lead to foreign policy change, he offers perhaps the most sophisticated discussion to date of how one might go about tracing and measuring the impact of societal activism on foreign policy. Knopf’s work shows the optimism about idealism that idealism can sometimes be quite realistic. Moreover Knopf’s work concentrated on the types of actors that have usually been neglected by many studies of international politics.
This book is no doubt a great source to have first hand information about commoners making a dent in US policies and has particularly aroused my interest in studying further on issues of international cooperation. However, Knopf gives insufficient weight to the transnational ties connecting the American anti-nuclear movement with those abroad, especially Western Europe.